One of the dispiriting consequences of being an economist with a memory is to see troubled governments embark on a policy cycle with well-established consequences.
To answer your question: The core of an AGR reactor comprises thousands of precision machined graphite bricks keyed together. Differential irradiation causes distortion of the bricks, internal stresses and cracking. Overtime, increased numbers of cracks risk the stability of the core structure and potential blockage of fuel or control rod channels. Maintenance of the core graphite is not possible. All that can be done is inspection and sampling to assess the extent of cracking and degree of risk. There might be some over-caution in determining the 45 year life span but the AGRs were designed for a 30 year life so we are to some extent on borrowed time. Most of the rest of the world uses water cooled, water moderated reactors (mainly PWRs, pressurised water reactors) where there is essentially a reactor pressure vessel containing fuel, a metal core structure and water. All these contents can be replaced as needed. It is only the pressure vessel (subject to radiation damage) which limits the life to about 60 years. It is the choice of the AGR design rather than the PWR (as France) which, in part has lead to the demise of the UK Nuclear industry along with UK manfacturing.
Thank you for an illuminating explanation. Your last point illustrates the (often hidden) costs of not-invented here preferences in an industry that relies so heavily on public support and lobbying. The Nuclear Industries Association is still lobbying for Great British Nuclear to build more AGR plants. There seems to be a consistent preference for theoretical advantages in efficiency and safety that in practice are outweighed by overcomplication, practical limitations and limited lives (by nuclear standards).
I live in Peterborough. The difference between BR and the franchisees on the ECML (some better than others) is chalk and cheese. Those who think the nationalisation of the railways is going to lead to a transport Nirvana are living in cloud cuckoo land.
I agree but memories are short. I lived in the US for over a decade spanning privatisation. When I came back to the UK in the early 2000s the experience of using the WCML from Carlisle was so much better than in the early 1990s even though the modernisation program was still underway. But there is a qualification. The performance of Northern Railways was just horrible in more recent years, largely because it was stuck with old rolling stock. Trans-Pennine Express was pretty poor as well though it had more modern rolling stock. And I used Thameslink in the 2000s which wasn't much good either.
I think overall the long distance routes were pretty good but regional railways had poor rolling stock and were never a priority.
Thank you for this Gordon, which contained some revelations - I feel I should have been paying more attention over the years. I have some resulting questions and a few thoughts. It's a matter of observation that large infrastructure projects quite often go off the rails (pun intended), but I would be most interested in your views as to why this is so. My experience of electronic development projects was that things seldom went smoothly. I attribute some of this to optimism on the part of engineers (mea culpa), plus a lack of project management as a discipline in itself, and over-ambitious projects attempting big leaps when a series of incremental developments would have been more effective. A later colleague with a different background wryly remarked on the undeclared project milestone on project plans "and now a miracle happens". Of course, technology projects in private industry are largely or entirely hidden from general view (apart from these days, Chinese spies).
I imagine efforts to manage by government and therefore civil servants would generally be doomed from the outset by lack of know-how as to how to go about the job, but that is my outsider's view. I also suspect that accountability and lines of management are often unclear, perhaps deliberately. I cite as my example the fiasco of major rail disruption following the introduction of a new timetable during the tenure of minister Chris Grayling. I watched some of the subsequent parliamentary select committee proceedings. The number of rail bosses in the room resembled a cast-of-thousands biblical epic movie, yet no-one admitted responsibility or, as far as I recollect, had anything useful to say. I expect they had handsome remuneration, but for what, remained a mystery.
This is a topic for many books. I have some limited experience, largely by being involved in post-completion evaluation exercises. Even for projects involving standard technology there is always pressure to promise that things can be done more quickly or cheaply than experience suggests is reasonable. The client - politicians, senior management, etc - always wants more so there is a tendency to over-promise. There is also the common assumption that without pressure things will just drift along, but that neglects the reality that unreasonable deadlines are just ignored. Bengt Flyvbjerg (from Oxford) has written several books on why large projects fail which are very illuminating.
For public projects the combination of limited or no accountability combined with constant turnover of staff in senior positions is pernicious. But I wonder whether Grayling would ever permit his staff or the rail bosses to question whether the change was achievable. Often it is the refusal of politicians and senior managers to listen to advice or questions that leads to disaster because they don't get told what they don't want to hear.
I have never understood why the TSB software replacement was such a mess because it should have been clear to everyone that a catastrophic failure would be career-ending. There must have been something in the internal culture of TSB or Banco Sadabell which meant that no one would listen.
To quote Ronald Reagan "The most terrifying words in the world are 'I'm from the Government, I'm here to help you '". My experience of running a micro business (4 staff) is that Government schemes were setup by people who didn't have a clue. The chance of similar people being able to manage a large, complex, distributed network of any kind is next to zero.....
I think that part of it is that there is a complete gulf between small companies and large organisations - whether public bureaucracies or large companies. The public sector designs support schemes for large companies with lots of internal slack. In my experience regulators behave in the same way since their main counterparts are bureaucratic organisations with thousands of employees - and I have seen both sides of this.
Excellent article. No mention that Engineers who designed, built and personally operated said infrastructure have been for generations demoted to the sideline of those professions that are focused on the arts. How often have these technical expert people have told, have been heard, but just not listened to for reasons that are politically and environmentally motivated regardless of impacts and costs to the taxpayer. Vanity and self-effacing are what they have been for the most part; Value negligible. The trouble is that very few can but say no; no more; enough.
Part of this is the cult of management. The idea that engineers and technical specialists are too cautious and that setting "stretch" targets can change reality. There are enormous differences between sectors - something that is 95% right may be ok for a new consumer product but not for a railway network. Also, targets that are unreasonable are meaningless because many know they can't be met and don't even try.
Another point is that the glamour of rapid technical innovation in some sectors - eg developing drones or AI - overwhelms the nitty-gritty of efficient management of processes and investment in areas where technical change is slower and competence is all important.
To answer your question: The core of an AGR reactor comprises thousands of precision machined graphite bricks keyed together. Differential irradiation causes distortion of the bricks, internal stresses and cracking. Overtime, increased numbers of cracks risk the stability of the core structure and potential blockage of fuel or control rod channels. Maintenance of the core graphite is not possible. All that can be done is inspection and sampling to assess the extent of cracking and degree of risk. There might be some over-caution in determining the 45 year life span but the AGRs were designed for a 30 year life so we are to some extent on borrowed time. Most of the rest of the world uses water cooled, water moderated reactors (mainly PWRs, pressurised water reactors) where there is essentially a reactor pressure vessel containing fuel, a metal core structure and water. All these contents can be replaced as needed. It is only the pressure vessel (subject to radiation damage) which limits the life to about 60 years. It is the choice of the AGR design rather than the PWR (as France) which, in part has lead to the demise of the UK Nuclear industry along with UK manfacturing.
Thank you for an illuminating explanation. Your last point illustrates the (often hidden) costs of not-invented here preferences in an industry that relies so heavily on public support and lobbying. The Nuclear Industries Association is still lobbying for Great British Nuclear to build more AGR plants. There seems to be a consistent preference for theoretical advantages in efficiency and safety that in practice are outweighed by overcomplication, practical limitations and limited lives (by nuclear standards).
I live in Peterborough. The difference between BR and the franchisees on the ECML (some better than others) is chalk and cheese. Those who think the nationalisation of the railways is going to lead to a transport Nirvana are living in cloud cuckoo land.
I agree but memories are short. I lived in the US for over a decade spanning privatisation. When I came back to the UK in the early 2000s the experience of using the WCML from Carlisle was so much better than in the early 1990s even though the modernisation program was still underway. But there is a qualification. The performance of Northern Railways was just horrible in more recent years, largely because it was stuck with old rolling stock. Trans-Pennine Express was pretty poor as well though it had more modern rolling stock. And I used Thameslink in the 2000s which wasn't much good either.
I think overall the long distance routes were pretty good but regional railways had poor rolling stock and were never a priority.
That, of course, goes back to the micro-management by the DfT. Thameslink is now very good.
Thank you for this Gordon, which contained some revelations - I feel I should have been paying more attention over the years. I have some resulting questions and a few thoughts. It's a matter of observation that large infrastructure projects quite often go off the rails (pun intended), but I would be most interested in your views as to why this is so. My experience of electronic development projects was that things seldom went smoothly. I attribute some of this to optimism on the part of engineers (mea culpa), plus a lack of project management as a discipline in itself, and over-ambitious projects attempting big leaps when a series of incremental developments would have been more effective. A later colleague with a different background wryly remarked on the undeclared project milestone on project plans "and now a miracle happens". Of course, technology projects in private industry are largely or entirely hidden from general view (apart from these days, Chinese spies).
I imagine efforts to manage by government and therefore civil servants would generally be doomed from the outset by lack of know-how as to how to go about the job, but that is my outsider's view. I also suspect that accountability and lines of management are often unclear, perhaps deliberately. I cite as my example the fiasco of major rail disruption following the introduction of a new timetable during the tenure of minister Chris Grayling. I watched some of the subsequent parliamentary select committee proceedings. The number of rail bosses in the room resembled a cast-of-thousands biblical epic movie, yet no-one admitted responsibility or, as far as I recollect, had anything useful to say. I expect they had handsome remuneration, but for what, remained a mystery.
This is a topic for many books. I have some limited experience, largely by being involved in post-completion evaluation exercises. Even for projects involving standard technology there is always pressure to promise that things can be done more quickly or cheaply than experience suggests is reasonable. The client - politicians, senior management, etc - always wants more so there is a tendency to over-promise. There is also the common assumption that without pressure things will just drift along, but that neglects the reality that unreasonable deadlines are just ignored. Bengt Flyvbjerg (from Oxford) has written several books on why large projects fail which are very illuminating.
For public projects the combination of limited or no accountability combined with constant turnover of staff in senior positions is pernicious. But I wonder whether Grayling would ever permit his staff or the rail bosses to question whether the change was achievable. Often it is the refusal of politicians and senior managers to listen to advice or questions that leads to disaster because they don't get told what they don't want to hear.
I have never understood why the TSB software replacement was such a mess because it should have been clear to everyone that a catastrophic failure would be career-ending. There must have been something in the internal culture of TSB or Banco Sadabell which meant that no one would listen.
To quote Ronald Reagan "The most terrifying words in the world are 'I'm from the Government, I'm here to help you '". My experience of running a micro business (4 staff) is that Government schemes were setup by people who didn't have a clue. The chance of similar people being able to manage a large, complex, distributed network of any kind is next to zero.....
I think that part of it is that there is a complete gulf between small companies and large organisations - whether public bureaucracies or large companies. The public sector designs support schemes for large companies with lots of internal slack. In my experience regulators behave in the same way since their main counterparts are bureaucratic organisations with thousands of employees - and I have seen both sides of this.
Excellent article. No mention that Engineers who designed, built and personally operated said infrastructure have been for generations demoted to the sideline of those professions that are focused on the arts. How often have these technical expert people have told, have been heard, but just not listened to for reasons that are politically and environmentally motivated regardless of impacts and costs to the taxpayer. Vanity and self-effacing are what they have been for the most part; Value negligible. The trouble is that very few can but say no; no more; enough.
Part of this is the cult of management. The idea that engineers and technical specialists are too cautious and that setting "stretch" targets can change reality. There are enormous differences between sectors - something that is 95% right may be ok for a new consumer product but not for a railway network. Also, targets that are unreasonable are meaningless because many know they can't be met and don't even try.
Another point is that the glamour of rapid technical innovation in some sectors - eg developing drones or AI - overwhelms the nitty-gritty of efficient management of processes and investment in areas where technical change is slower and competence is all important.